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    Abstract—In this paper, we consider context-awareness to 
enhance route reliability and robustness in multi-hop cognitive 
networks. A novel context-aware route discovery protocol is 
presented to enable secondary users to select the route according 
to their QoS requirements. The protocol facilitates adjacent relay 
selection under different criteria, such as shortest available path, 
route reliability and relay reputation. New routing and security-
based metrics are defined to measure route robustness in spatial, 
frequency and temporal domains. Secure throughput, defined as 
the percentage of traffic not being intercepted in the network, is 
provided. The resources needed for trading are then obtained by 
jointly optimizing secure throughput and trading price. 
Simulation results show that when there is a traffic imbalance of 
factor 4 between the primary and secondary networks, 4 channels 
are needed to achieve 90% link reliability and 99% secure 
throughput in the secondary network. Besides, when relay 
reputation varies from 0.5 to 0.9, a 20% variation in the required 
resources is observed. 
 
Index Terms—Cognitive network, context-awareness, multi-
hop cellular network, spectrum trading, QoS, routing, reliability.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Future 5G cellular networks face the challenge of acquiring 
adequate spectral resources to meet the increasing demand for 
new services and applications. Cognitive radio (CR) [1] 
emerged as a promising technology which endows wireless 
devices with the capability to adapt their operating parameters 
based on the radio environment and utilize the spectrum in an 
opportunistic manner. Moreover, enabling multi-hop 
communication can further increase bandwidth efficiency, 
coverage and provide ubiquitous connectivity. Despite the 
many advantages, multi-hop cognitive networks face unique 
security challenges. 
Secondary users (SUs) have mostly used context-aware 
information enabled by CR for sensing purposes to detect the 
presence of primary users (PUs) [2] and also for physical layer 
security [3]. While context-awareness has been applied for 
routing decisions in ad-hoc networks [4], few works have 
considered it to make networking decisions in CR networks 
[5]-[7]. The application of reinforcement learning to dynamic 
channel selection, scheduling, and congestion control is 
addressed in [5], which shows it improves network 
performance in terms of throughput and stability, and 
significant reduces channel switching. In [6]-[7] the robustness 
of routing in CR is considered. These works focus on the 
coexistence of PUs and SUs, and provide solutions to secure 
PUs, but ignore security for SUs. 
This work takes advantage of context-awareness to provide 
reliable routes and enable SUs to accurately estimate the 
resources for trading needed to satisfy their QoS requirements. 
Spectrum trading for multi-hop secondary networks has 
attracted some attention lately [8]-[9]. These works ignore 
both the uncertainty of channel availability due to PU activity 
and QoS provisioning. Besides, they consider truthfulness in 
the bidding process and ignore the trustworthiness of the 
required resources. Thus, in order to prevent users from being 
treated as cheaters and lose the chance to obtain resources, 
additional mechanisms are needed to provide reliable routes. 
In this paper, we exploit context-awareness to improve route 
reliability and robustness in multi-hop secondary networks. 
First, a novel context-aware route discovery protocol is 
developed, which is aware of both user availability to relay 
and available channels. The optimum number of channels and 
switching time are obtained to satisfy users’ QoS requirements 
in terms of reliability and delay. Then, new routing and 
security-based metrics are defined to measure route robustness 
in the spatial, frequency and time domains. A usage-based 
pricing model is presented and the optimum number of 
resources to trade is obtained to satisfy the users’ QoS  
requirements, and optimize  secure  throughput and price 
trade-off.  
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as 
follows. 
1) A network model for multi-hop cognitive cellular 
networks (MC2Ns) that is context-aware and enables fine-
grained adaptation to network requirements in a 3D scale 
(spatial, frequency and temporal domains). The model is 
mapped into an absorbing Markov chain to analyze a number 
of performance metrics (such as delay and reliability).  
2) A novel context-aware route discovery protocol that 
considers the availability probability of the SUs to relay and 
the available channels according to PU activity. The protocol 
considers different relaying priorities such as shortest available 
distance, route reliability and relay reputation. 
3) New routing and security-based metrics are defined to 
measure robustness on the spatial, frequency and temporal 
domains, and secure throughput. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system 
model is described in Section II. In Section III, the context-
aware route discovery protocol is presented and analyzed. 
Numerical results are given in Section IV. Finally, Section V 
concludes the paper. 
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Fig. 1. Network model with K-reuse pattern for K = 7. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Network Model 
We consider a densely deployed multi-hop cognitive 
cellular network (MC2N) as shown in Fig.1. For modeling 
purposes, the area of the cell is divided into hexagonal 
subcells1 of radius r. In each subcell, there is, potentially, a SU 
that may act as a source, relay or destination. We assume that a 
spectrum owner or primary operator (PO) leases its idle 
channels to SUs. Due to PU activity, there is uncertainty 
regarding channel availability (PU activity is modeled in detail 
in Section III.C). Each SU is equipped with one radio capable 
of switching between different channels. The SU source will 
transmit to its intended destination by relaying to adjacent SUs 
(located in adjacent subcells) through the available channels. 
Besides, an adjacent SU will be available to relay with 
probability p, which depends on coverage, battery charge, and 
willingness to cooperate.  
B. Tessellation Factor and Scheduling 
We assume that the BS is surrounded by H concentric rings 
of subcells. In the example in Fig.1, H=3. For simplicity, we 
approximate that in each subcell the SU potentially available 
to relay is located in the center of the subcell. The relaying 
distance between adjacent subcells is denoted by dr and is 
related to the subcell radius as 3rd r  .  
We assume that a user i can successfully transmit to its 
adjacent relay j when the received power at j exceeds the 
receiver sensitivity ε.  For a given relaying distance dr, the 
minimum transmission power for user i is Pi,min = ε·(dr)
α, 
where α is the path loss factor. Users are interested in 
transmitting with the minimum power possible Pi = Pi,min to 
reduce interference and power consumption. For simplicity, 
we assume that the tessellation factor r is the same for all 
subcells and thus, users transmit with the same power Pi = P. 
Let us assume that user i transmits to its adjacent user j and 
at the same time there is an interfering user u transmitting on 
the same channel as shown in Fig. 1. Then, the signal to 
interference plus noise ratio at any relay is given by [10] 
 
1This partition is not physically implemented in the network, but rather 
used to capture the mutual relations between the terminals in the cell that are 
potentially available to relay each other’s messages [10]. 
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where iw
ijG  is the channel gain between user i and j on channel 
wi, nwi is the number of concurrent transmissions using that 
channel, iw
ujG  is the channel gain between interfering users u 
and j on channel wi, Nr is the background noise power, θi is the 
separation angle between user i and receiver j and interfering 
user u and, K is the tessellation factor explained below. As we 
are considering a dense network, the channel model adopted 
includes propagation losses, but not the effects of fading due to 
the proximity between the users [10]. The Shannon capacity on 
link l is given by log(1 ( , ))l ic SINR w P   and the capacity on 
the route R is minR R lc c .                  
Thus, the normalized route capacity when wR channels are 
used on the route can be obtained as  
/R R Rc c w .                                       (2) 
The optimization of the scheduling in a multi-hop network 
is an NP-hard problem [11], [12]. To keep the scheduling 
process simple, we apply a conventional resource reuse 
scheme for cellular networks to our tessellation scheme, shown 
in Fig. 1, for the resource reuse factor K = 7. The subcell index 
within the cluster indicates the slot allocation, k =1,..., K. Users 
with the same slot index will transmit simultaneously. The 
transmission turn (in a round robin fashion) is given by the slot 
index. To avoid transmission/reception collisions, users can 
transmit simultaneously if they are separated by a distance d > 
2dr. This constraint is a direct consequence of the fact that 
users are equipped with a single radio. In this way, 
transmissions will be collision-free regardless of the adjacent 
relay or channel chosen for transmission. This constraint holds 
for K ≥ 7. To take advantage of all available channels and 
reduce the interference level in the network, we will randomly 
assign a different channel to each subcell that shares the same 
transmission slot.  
The K-scheduling pattern proposed is a heuristic that avoids 
the complexity of re-computing the schedule according to PU 
activity and user availability to relay. 
C. Cognitive Channel Availability 
We model channel availability when a routing/relaying 
decision is made. For this purpose, we consider data session 
arrivals into a cell of a cellular network with capacity of c 
channels and determine the probability that the primary 
operator will not use b out of c channels. By modeling arrivals 
as a Poisson process and session duration as exponentially 
distributed, this probability can be obtained as a solution of the 
birth/death equations for a conventional M/M/c system. This 
model  has  been  widely  used  in  the  literature  [13]. If we 
consider that the arrival rate is λPn = λP for n PUs and the 
service rate is µP (they are state-independent), then the 
probability that the PO will not use b out of c channels is [14]  
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where p0 is obtained for rP = λP / µP and ρP = rP / c < 1 as 
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The SU will have a channel available as long as there is at 
least one channel that is not being used by the PO. Hence, the 
probability that there will be at least a channels available is 
1c
a bb a
p p


                                   (4) 
where pb is obtained using (3).  
We assume that spectrum monitoring is perfect and focus on 
the probability that a PU returns to a channel currently 
allocated to an SU. This is checked at every hop of the SU 
route. We approximate the calculation by assuming that the 
average service time of the SU is 1/μS. Then, the probability of 
kP new PUs arriving within that time interval is [14]  
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The probability that a specific channel out of b is allocated 
to one of the kP new arrivals is kP/b. So, the average probability 
of PU return to a particular channel is 
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If a PU returns to the channel currently allocated to a SU, 
the transmission will be interrupted and the SU will be forced 
to try a new option. Equation (5) can be further averaged out to 
give the average PU return probability defined as 
,return b b returnb
p p p                          (6) 
where pb is given by (3). 
The impact of PU activity on route discovery is considered 
in the following section. 
III. CONTEXT-AWARE ROUTE DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 
This section presents a route discovery protocol for SUs and 
its analysis. By following the K-scheduling pattern, collisions 
between adjacent relays are avoided and thus, we focus on 
discovering the route based on users’ availability to relay and 
PU activity.  
A. Description of the Protocol 
Let us assume that in subcell i there is an SU willing to 
transmit to an intended destination by relaying to adjacent 
users. As each user has 6 adjacent subcells, the candidate relay 
may be in any of these subcells m, m = 1,.., 6. We start by 
assuming that the route discovery protocol provides the 
shortest available path. Then, according to the relay priorities 
given by the distance to the destination, the SU first checks the 
availability of the adjacent user (located in the adjacent 
subcell) in the direction corresponding to the shortest distance 
towards the destination. The user will be available to relay 
with probability p. If so, the SU will transmit to the adjacent 
subcell by using a cognitive channel, and this transition will 
occur with probability pm=1. If the relay in this adjacent cell is 
not available, the SU will check the availability of the next 
adjacent user (2nd user), as shown in Fig. 2.  If that user is 
available, the SU will relay to him/her. This transition will 
occur with probability pm=2. Otherwise, the protocol continues 
in the same fashion until it checks the last adjacent user (6th 
user). If in the last adjacent subcell there is no user available to 
relay, the route will not be established, which happens with 
probability p0. This protocol will be referred to as shortest 
available path routing (SaPR). 
As channel availability depends on the activity of the PUs, 
in any system state a PU may return to the channel after the 
transmission to a relay is initiated. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 
as well. In this case, the process will be aborted (with 
probability preturn) and the SU will try another channel. 
The relaying probability from subcell i to any adjacent 
subcell j can be obtained by mapping the transmission pair (i,j) 
→ m, as    
       
1(1 )mm ap p p p 
  , m = 1,…,6                   (7) 
where pa is the probability that the SU has a channel available 
and is obtained by (4) when pa (a = 1), p is the probability that 
in the adjacent subcell there is a user willing to relay, and ξ is 
the probability that there will not be a PU return to the 
channel, ξ = 1 – preturn, and preturn is given by (6). Parameter ξ 
will be used in Section III.C to measure link reliability. 
The overall probability of relaying to any adjacent subcell is 
 
t mm
p p                                    (8) 
where pm is given by (7). The probability that the SU will not 
be able to transmit to any of the adjacent users is p0 = 1 – pt, 
which is represented as a transition to an absorbing state nr (no 
route).
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Fig. 2. Representation of the state transition probabilities given by (7). 
 
B. Analysis of the Protocol 
We define a relaying probability matrix P = [pij] where entry 
pij indicates the relaying probability from subcell i to j. This 
probability can be obtained from (7) by mapping the 
transmission from subcell i to any adjacent subcell j as (i,j) → 
m. It is worth noticing that P also defines the network 
topology. To analyze the relaying process in the network, we 
map the tessellation scheme into an absorbing Markov chain 
with a set of absorbing states { , }s D nr . These states 
represent the end of the route when the user has reached the 
destination (e.g., BS, AP, mobile to mobile connection) or 
when no route (nr) is available.  
Then, we reorganize the relaying matrix into an (N + 1) (N + 
1) matrix of the form [15]  
*
  
   
 
  
 
I 0
P
R Q
                                    (9) 
where N is the number of subcells, I is an NA  NA diagonal 
unitary matrix corresponding to the number of absorbing 
states, 0 is an NA  (N – NA + 1) all-zero matrix, R is the (N – 
NA + 1)  NA matrix of transition probabilities from transient 
states to absorbing states and Q is the (N – NA + 1)  (N – NA + 
1) matrix of transition probabilities between transient states.  
By defining N = (I – Q)-1, the mean time for the process to 
reach any absorbing state starting from transient state i is [15] 
1 1( ,..., )A
t
N N T T 

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1τ (I Q) 1 N1            (10) 
when the dwell time for any state i is the same, T = Ti and 1 is 
an (N – NA + 1)   1 column vector of ones. Otherwise, τ = (I – Q)
-1
v 
= Nv where v is a column vector whose components are Ti. 
For the normalized dwell time T = Ti = 1, the entries τi of 
vector τ represent the average number of hops (route length) 
from state i to the absorbing state. 
The probability that the Markov process starting in a 
transient state i will end up in an absorbing state j is eij, where 
E = [eij] =  (I –  Q)
-1
R                             (11) 
If we denote by f the vector of probabilities of initial user 
positions, the probabilities of accessing the destination and 
finding no route are 
[ , ]D nr p p fE                                  (12) 
where, 
,1 , 1( ,..., )A
t
D D D N Np p  p  and ,1 , 1( ,..., )A
t
nr nr nr N Np p  p . 
C. Route Reliability 
We define route reliability as the probability of non PU 
return on the route, 
R ll R
 

 , where ξl is the link 
reliability on every hop of the route R. In order to determine 
the resources needed to guarantee a certain level of route 
reliability, we will start by analyzing the reliability per link.  
Let us assume that the duration of a single hop transmission 
is given by the SU service rate as tS = 1/µS. To avoid collision 
of the incoming PU on the channel being used by an SU, the 
SU will switch to another channel before this happens.  
We consider that PU arrivals on every hop are independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d). Hence, link reliability is the 
same on every hop of the route, ξl = ξ. Therefore, route 
reliability can be approximated as ξR = ξ 
τ, where τ is the route 
length given by (10). As a reminder, link reliability, ξ = 1 –  
preturn, decreases in time as the probability of PU return 
exponentially increases. For a minimum required level of route 
reliability, ξR,min, the equivalent minimum link reliability is 
min ,minR
  . As the number of channels are limited, the 
switching interval should be the maximum that satisfies the 
link reliability requirements. Thus, the channel switching time 
per link can be determined as 
*
minargmax  ( ( ) )ww t w wt t t                    (13)  
where *
wt  is the maximum duration of the time interval that 
satisfies the link reliability ξmin. The more restrictive ξmin is, the 
more often the channel should be switched to avoid PU return. 
The number of times the channel is switched per link per 
message is thus, nw = tS / tw. As PU and SU arrivals are 
independent, the minimum number of backup channels needed 
to satisfy the reliability requirement per hop can be determined 
as follows, 
min
,            
/ ,    
w P S
w P S P S
n t t
w
n t t t t

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                           (14) 
which depends on the PU service time tP, tP = 1/ µP. If tP ≥ tS, 
nw different channels are needed per link; otherwise the 
channels will be reused with a reusability factor tP / tS. 
In general, link reliability can be increased by considering a 
number of backup channels w and switching the channel at 
intervals t = tw = tS / w. The new preturn can be obtained by (5)-
(6) for the previous time interval. Besides, the relaying 
probability should be modified as 
1( ) (1 ) ( )mm a wp p a w p p t
   , m = 1,…,6          (15) 
where pa is the probability that the SU has w channels 
available and is obtained by (4) when pa (a = w), p is the user 
willingness to relay, and ξ is the probability that there will not 
be a PU return to the channel, ξ = 1 – preturn, with preturn in 
interval t = tw given by (6). Equations (9)-(12) can be obtained 
as before for the new relaying probability. 
Users also have QoS requirements in terms of delay. For a 
maximum tolerable delay, τmax, the number of backup channels 
w needed is 
min
* 2
max= argmin  ( ( , ))w ww p w                    (16)  
where τ is given by (10), p is the relay availability probability, 
and wmin is obtained in (14). It is worth noting that the number 
of backup channels w will impact the delay τ as the relaying 
probability will be affected in (15). 
 Channel reusability between adjacent hops depends on the 
relation between tP and tS. Based on this, the minimum number 
of channels the SU needs to buy from the PO to satisfy QoS 
requirements in terms of reliability and delay is 
*
*
,min *
,            
/ ,    
P S
R
P S P S
w t t
w
w t t t t
 
 

                          (17) 
where w* is the optimum number of backup channels per hop. 
If tP ≤ tS, the same channels can be reused in adjacent hops. 
Otherwise, the number of channels needed per route increases 
by factor tP / tS.  
D. Security Improvements 
D1. Relay Reputation 
We obtain the reputation of the relays based on the previous 
experiences of users with a relay in terms of packet 
forwarding. The reputation varies from 0 to 1, where 0 is 
completely untrustworthy and 1 is the opposite. We denote by 
a
ijs  the advertised security level by a relay j. When user i 
relays to j, it will calculate the relaying experience 
e
ijs  as 
e
ijs  = 
pt, where pt is the probability that the user will transmit to an 
adjacent relay (8). Combining both factors, the current 
experience 
c
ijs  is obtained as /
c e a
ij ij ijs s s  .  If we consider 
past trustworthiness histories, the probability that user i will 
have a safe connection when relaying to j, sij, can be calculated 
using the exponential moving average as  
( ) (1 ) ( 1),          if 1
( )
( ),                                       otherwise
c
e ij e ij
ij c
ij
s t s t t
s t
s t
     
 

         (18)  
where αe is a weighting factor between 0 and 1 and t represents 
the current episode within a particular window of episodes. 
Large αe values will assign more weight to current episodes 
than previous ones.  
The context-aware route discovery protocol can be modified 
to include relay reputation by introducing the level of trust into 
the relaying probability in (7) as 
1(1 )mm a mp p p p s
  , m = 1,…,6                               
where sm is obtained by mapping the transmission pair as (i,j) 
→ m. The resulting routing protocol will be referred to as 
secure path routing (SecPR). 
D2. Probability of being intercepted 
We measure the probability that an SU transmission will be 
intercepted in spatial, frequency and time domains in our 
MC2N model. We denote by σj the robustness to be intercepted 
in dimension j, j ∈ {s, f, t}. The SU will be intercepted if it is 
intercepted in all three dimensions. Thus, the eavesdropper 
needs to know the subcell from which the user is transmitting 
as well as the frequency and time slot. In a route of τ hops, the 
probability of interception is 
{ , , }
1 1 (1 )d jj s f tp



    
                 (19) 
which is the probability that the transmission will be 
intercepted in at least one hop of the route. 
Spatial robustness 
Let assume that there are k eavesdroppers randomly located 
in the network. The probability that the SU will be intercepted 
in space is k/N, where N is the number of subcells. Spatial 
robustness is thus defined as 
1 /s k N   .                                 (20)  
Frequency robustness 
We assume that an eavesdropper can observe all available 
channels c in the macrocell. If we consider that the 
eavesdropper selects one channel and waits to detect the 
transmission on that channel, then frequency robustness is  
1 1/f c   .                                  (21)  
Time robustness 
We denote by to the eavesdropper observation time per day, 
which is the amount of time the eavesdropper is actively 
observing the network, and tS time duration of the SU 
transmission. If we assume that to > tS, time robustness is 
1 / 24t ot   .                                 (22)  
E. Throughput and Pricing 
We define the normalized throughput as /RT c K , where 
Rc  is the normalized capacity when wR channels are used in 
the route and is given by (2), τ is the route length as in (10), 
and K is the duration of the scheduling. Then, a new metric 
called normalized secure throughput is defined as the portion 
of traffic not being intercepted, 
s ndT p T                                        (23) 
where pnd is the probability of non-interception, pnd = 1 – pd. 
 We adopt a usage-based pricing scheme, where the primary 
operator charges the SU for the number of channels requested 
and the duration of the transmission. We assume a fixed fee 
per channel Фw and a time unit of transmission Фt. Then, the 
pricing function is represented as follows, 
R w s tprice w t                                (24)  
where wR is the number of channels requested and τ · ts is the 
duration of the transmission, with τ representing route length 
and ts service time.   
Then, if we define the utility of the SU as U T price   , 
the optimum number of resources wR needed to satisfy the 
reliability and delay requirements can be obtained as 
,min
maximize   
subject to    
Rw
R R
U T price
w w
  

                       (25) 
where γ is a scaling parameter and wR,min is the minimum 
number of channels needed to satisfy the QoS requirements as 
obtained in (17).  
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We conducted Monte Carlo simulations in Matlab to 
evaluate network performance with our context-aware 
solutions. The results were obtained over 1000 realizations. 
We considered the network shown in Fig. 1, where the radius 
of the macrocell is R = 1000 m, H = 4, and P = 0.75. The path 
loss exponent is α = 2 and the noise power spectral density is 
Nr = 10
-4 W/Hz. We assume that there are c = 10 channels in 
the cellular network, n of which are occupied by PUs, and a 
potentially available channels for SUs. The available channels 
during a given transmission slot are randomly allocated to the 
SUs sharing that slot, according to the K-reuse pattern.  
A. Route Reliability 
In Fig. 3, we present the utility defined as in (13) versus the 
switching time tw for different traffic situations in the 
secondary network. We can see that for a fixed λP and a target 
reliability requirement ξmin, the optimum switching time 
*
wt  
increases with the secondary user service rate µS, as the 
probability of a return during the secondary user service time 
is lower. 
In Fig. 4, the minimum number of channels wmin to satisfy a 
given ξmin is shown. We assume µP = 4λP and different 
secondary user service rates µS. We can see that wmin is lower 
when networks are more imbalanced (i.e., µS = 8λP). A 
reliability requirement of ξmin= 0.90 can be achieved with 2 to 
4 channels when µS = 8λP to 4λP. However, when µS = 2λP, the 
number of channels is doubled. In all cases, if the reliability 
requirement increases from 0.9 to 0.95, wmin increases 
significantly. 
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Fig. 3. Utility (13) versus tw for ξmin = 0.9. 
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Fig. 4. Minimum number of channels wmin versus ξmin. 
 
In Fig. 5, the utility defined in (16) is shown versus w for 
the previous traffic situations. The relay availability 
probability p was fixed to 1 and the reliability requirement to 
ξmin = 0.9. A maximum tolerable delay of τmax = 3.5 was 
assumed. We can see that the previous QoS requirements are 
achieved with w* = 2 when µS = 8λP, with w
* = 3 when µS = 
6λP, with w
* = 4 when µS = 4λP and w
* = 8, otherwise. It is 
worth noting that to satisfy this QoS requirement, the optimum 
number of channels w*= wmin. In the rest of the simulations µS 
= µP = 4λP was considered and thus, 
* *
Rw w . 
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Fig. 5. Utility (16) versus w for ξmin = 0.9, and τmax = 3.5 when p = 1. 
B. Security Improvements 
We considered a relay advertising a security level of 0.9. 
Based on the previous experience a user had with this relay, 
the advertised security level was only provided for 15% of the 
time. For the remaining time, a security level between 0.5 and 
0.9 was obtained. The relay reputation is shown in Fig. 6 for 
different observation instants t. The results were obtained for T 
= 100 observations. We can see that, for a weight αe = 2/(T+1) 
= 0.02, the algorithm converged to a reputation s = 0.75. 
However, if αe increased, the relay reputation oscillated and 
convergence was slower or did not occur. 
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Fig. 6. Relay reputation (s) as in (18) versus the observation (t).  
 
In Fig. 7 we present the average delay versus the weight αe 
used to estimate the reputation of the relay in (18). It is worth 
noting that when αe < 0.5 (the past history has more weight 
than the current observation), the delay oscillated less. For 
small values of αe (αe = 0.02) the delay was almost constant. 
When we only considered the current observation, as in 
existing routing protocols (e.g., [16], [17]), the delay could 
incur in an error of  10% on the final delay. It can be also 
observed that the delay decreased for higher p. 
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Fig. 7. Average delay considering relay reputation as in (18) versus αe.  
 
In Fig. 8, the probability of not being intercepted, pnd, is 
shown versus wmin for different availability probabilities p. We 
assumed that there was an eavesdropper in 10% of the subcells 
and that the observation time was 8 hours per day. We can see 
that pnd increases with p and wmin as the delay τ is lower. Every 
additional 10% increase in the number of eavesdroppers 
resulted in an additional 1% decrease in pnd. These results are 
not shown due to space constraints. 
In Fig. 9, the throughput and secure throughput are shown 
versus p for different channel requirements, wR,min. We can see 
that 99% of the traffic was safely transmitted in the 3D 
domain. If wR,min increased by 2 channels, the throughput 
decreased by about 15% in average. Besides, as the required 
wR,min increased, the effects of the availability probability on 
throughput become negligible. 
In Fig. 10, the utility defined as in (25) is shown versus 
wR,min. We considered τmax = 3.5. The wR,min values needed to 
satisfy this requirement are shown along the dash line. We can 
see that when p = 0.6, the maximum utility was obtained for 
wR,min = 3 (ξmin = 0.87). If the user requires higher reliability, 
the utility decreased as the price was higher. For higher p the 
optimum utility was obtained for wR,min = 2 (ξmin = 0.80).  
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Fig. 8. Probability of avoiding interception versus p. 
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Fig. 9. Throughput versus p. 
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Fig. 10. Utility (25) versus wR,min. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we consider context-awareness to increase 
route reliability and robustness in multi-hop cognitive cellular 
networks. A context-aware route discovery protocol that uses 
different criteria for route discovery (e.g., shortest available 
path, safest path) is presented. User QoS requirements are 
considered in route selection. Optimum switching time and 
number of channels are obtained to guarantee the required 
level of link reliability and delay. Then, new routing and 
security-based metrics are defined to measure robustness in 
space, time and frequency domains. A new metric denoted as 
security throughput is also defined to indicate the percentage 
of traffic not being intercepted in the network.   
The results of extensive simulations conducted show that the 
reliability of the secondary network mainly depends on traffic 
imbalance between the secondary and primary networks. 
When there is an imbalance of factor 4, 4 channels are needed 
per link to guarantee a link reliability of 90%. Besides, 
robustness to interception in the spatial, frequency and time 
domains results in a secure throughput of 99%. For higher 
imbalances in both networks, even larger improvements are 
expected. Moreover, when relay reputation varies from 0.5 to 
0.9, a 20% variation in resources is observed. The results are 
useful for determining the resources needed for secure 
spectrum trading.  
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